Islam and the Alleged Incompatibility with Popular Culture by Hecker, Pierre
Middle East – Topics & Arguments #07–2017
Anti/thesis 95
This paper critically reflects upon the 
alleged incompatibility of Islam and pop-
ular culture, the antipathy toward the 
study of popular culture in the field of 
Islamic Studies, and the question of what 
it is that puts “the popular” into culture.
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Islam and Popular Culture
When preparing the present META issue, 
Igor Johannsen and I realized that, in the 
overall discourse on culture, particular 
attention has to be devoted to the issue of 
“popular culture.” Having done research 
on heavy metal and hip hop in the Middle 
East, it seemed inevitable to us to address 
this highly ambiguous concept, especially 
since both fields, metal and hip hop stud-
ies alike, are commonly assigned to the 
realm of popular culture. Furthermore, 
academic attention in the fields of Middle 
Eastern and Islamic studies has increas-
ingly shifted toward issues of popular cul-
ture in recent years, but only after this par-
ticular area of research had been widely 
neglected for a long period of time.
At the time I began working on my PhD 
dissertation on Heavy Metal in a Muslim 
Context over a decade ago, I usually 
received astonished, sometimes disdain-
ful looks from friends and colleagues 
when I first told them about the subject of 
my research. Not only did many of them 
consider the topic to be “exotic,” but, 
even worse, academically irrelevant. Peo-
ple were either surprised about the very 
existence of metal culture in the Muslim 
world or regarded the phenomenon not 
to be worth investigating, as they refused 
to classify it as a serious research topic. 
Back then, the field of metal studies was 
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still to be established. Yet, from today’s 
perspective, I see these reactions as a 
result of the dominant discourse on 
“Islamic culture,” rather than a lack of aca-
demic research on metal (for more details 
on the debate on “Islamic culture” see the 
editorial of this issue).
Islam, from an essentialist perspective á la 
G.E. Grunebaum, Bernard Lewis, or Sam-
uel P. Huntington, is still widely seen as the 
organizing principle of Muslim-dominated 
societies. Islam purportedly not only pro-
vides the rules of personal conduct and 
belief, but, moreover, the essence of a 
superordinate, collective identity. The effi-
cacy of this highly problematic under-
standing of culture as a coherent and 
more or less closed system entails that the 
appropriation of cultural resources from 
outside the system must be perceived as 
“unnatural,” non-representative (of 
“Islamic culture”) and, therefore, irrelevant 
in the long term. Heavy metal in a Muslim 
context, viewed from this perspective, 
must be equally seen as something for-
eign or alien or possibly even considered 
a matter of cultural imperialism. The visible 
presence of a subculture that originates 
from the working-class districts of Bir-
mingham in England is something that 
should not exist in Muslim societies, in the 
first place, and, if it nevertheless does, is to 
be considered a highly exceptional phe-
nomenon. With regard to the results of my 
own research, I dare claim that the pres-
ence of heavy metal is by no means an 
exceptional phenomenon in the Muslim 
world. I, moreover, assume that for most 
metalheads in Turkey, for instance, it would 
seem odd to consider heavy metal as 
something foreign or alien, as they were 
socialized into this culture in similar ways 
as fellow metalheads in Germany, Japan, 
the US or elsewhere—though the societal 
meaning of doing metal in Turkey admit-
tedly has to be considered differently from 
other social or political contexts (Hecker). 
The globalization of cultural resources and 
the formation of hybrid identities in vari-
ous contexts all over the world have long 
rendered essentialist assertions by Orien-
talist writers untenable. The persistence of 
the Islam-and-the-West paradigm, how-
ever, still fosters the widespread idea of 
the inherently “Western nature” of popular 
culture, making it therefore incompatible 
with Islam or “Islamic culture.”
Another obstacle to the study of popular 
culture has been the persistence of par-
ticular academic traditions in the field of 
Islamic studies. The German Council of 
Science and Humanities only a few years 
ago came to the conclusion that “the field 
of Islamic Studies in Germany remains 
deep in the tradition of Oriental studies” 
(35), which in essence means that, as an 
academic discipline, German Islamic Stud-
ies are rooted in a philological tradition of 
studying religious, philosophical, and his-
torical texts from the past. This may no lon-
ger hold true for the entire discipline, 
especially with regard to the vast number 
of rather recent studies on contemporary 
Islamic movements in Germany. The study 
of popular culture, however, is still widely 
seen as lying beyond the research inter-
ests of Islamic studies. The primary pur-
pose of Islamic studies appears to remain 
in the study of the “major languages of 
Islam” (i.e. Arabic, Persian, and Turkish) 
and the analysis of written texts that are 
somehow related to religion. Popular cul-
tural phenomena such as heavy metal, hip 
hop, fashion, comic books, soap operas, 
or the like have been widely neglected 
until recently, even when seen from a per-
spective of conveying or contesting 
Islamic traditions and values.
What is Popular Culture?
Despite all reservations, recent years have 
seen the publication of several edited vol-
umes on popular culture in the fields of 
Middle Eastern and Islamic studies. In 
2011, Andrew N. Weintraub edited the vol-
ume Islam and Popular Culture in Indone-
sia and Malaysia which was followed by 
Walid El Hamamsy and Mounira Soliman’s 
Popular Culture in the Middle East and 
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North Africa in 2013 and Karin van Nieu-
wkerk, Mark Levine, and Martin Stokes’ 
Islam and Popular Culture in 2016. All 
three volumes underline the significance 
of popular culture, not only in the every-
day lives of ordinary people, but also with 
regard to politics. The study of popular 
culture is therefore of considerable aca-
demic relevance.
What the books of El Hamamsy/Soliman 
and Nieuwkerk/Levine/Stokes have in 
common is a neo-Gramscian approach, 
which originally evolved in British Cultural 
Studies in the 1970s (see also John Sto-
rey’s contribution in this issue). Popular 
culture is thus seen by the authors as a 
means of resistance and containment. It is 
a site of political struggle and functions to 
either contest or consolidate the political 
power of the ruling elite. The authors 
explicitly relate this definition to the upris-
ings of the so-called “Arab Spring,” during 
which graffiti, street theater, hip-hop, rai, 
and other forms of cultural production 
played a crucial role in the process of 
political mobilization. Popular culture, in 
this sense, is defined through meaning 
rather than form.
This, however, poses serious challenges 
to the observer. To conceptualize popular 
culture as representations of resistance 
and containment requires to closely study 
the production of meaning in the particu-
lar research context. Only if it is possible 
to determine the dominant representa-
tions that are being contested and con-
tained as well as the signifiers that repre-
sent resistance will it be possible to 
classify particular cultural phenomena as 
popular culture. In other words, the ques-
tion of what popular culture is depends 
on the particular research context. For 
instance, the depiction of penguins in 
graffiti and street art would most probably 
not be interpreted as a challenge to the 
political system in the UK, in Turkey’s post-
Gezi Park era, however, penguins signify 
resistance toward the present govern-
ment of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The pen-
guin attained its iconic meaning during 
the so-called Gezi Park protests in the 
summer of 2013. While the cable news 
channel CNN International, at the height 
of the protests, provided live coverage of 
the political events, its Turkish affiliate 
CNN Türk broadcasted a documentary on 
penguins instead. The protesters 
regarded CNN Türk’s decision as an act of 
censorship and, accordingly, incorpo-
rated the penguin as a symbolic icon into 
their protest movement. Even today the 
image of the penguin is used as a symbol 
of defiance and remembrance of the 
democratic protests that were violently 
suppressed by the government. Conse-
quentially, it is not graffiti and street art in 
itself that makes it popular culture, but its 
relational meaning in a particular socio-
political context. Penguins depicted by 
graffiti artists in the streets of London can 
therefore not be classified as popular cul-
ture—based on the assumption that graffiti 
and street art are no longer per se consid-
ered as a deviant art form by the authori-
ties and the British public.
Needless to say, there are various ways of 
conceptualizing popular culture, and the 
aforementioned neo-Gramscian 
approach, due to its specific focus on 
resistance and containment, is clearly lim-
ited. John Storey in his highly acclaimed 
book Cultural Theory and Popular Cul-
ture stresses the ambiguous nature of the 
term by arguing that “popular culture is 
in effect an empty conceptual category, 
one that can be filled in a wide variety of 
often conflicting ways, depending on the 
context of use” (1). Nevertheless, he also 
argues that the study of popular culture 
has been determined by a collection of 
six different approaches that, although 
they are partly overlapping, can be clearly 
identified. Namely, these are popular cul-
ture as widely favored or well-liked by 
many; as inferior culture (in contrast to 
high culture); as mass culture (mass-pro-
duced for mass consumption); as folk cul-
ture (the culture that originates from “the 
people”); as a site of struggle between 
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subordinate and dominant groups (see 
above); as postmodern culture (6-13). 
Storey therefore would most probably 
argue that meaning alone does not put 
the “popular” into culture. He stresses, for 
instance, that popular culture must 
include a quantitative dimension (6). This 
idea of popular culture as something that 
is favored or well-liked by a huge number 
of people can, however, at least occa-
sionally conflict with the previously out-
lined approach of popular culture as a 
site of resistance: The internationally 
renowned song “Şıkıdım” (“Shake”) by 
Turkish pop singer Tarkan may be popu-
lar in terms of numbers (music down-
loads, record sales, radio airplay, clicks 
on YouTube, etc.), but not in terms of 
resistance. By the same token, the “resis-
tance factor” in Murder King’s Gezi-
related song “Demokrasi” (“Democracy”) 
is certainly high, its “popularity” due the 
relatively small number of Turkish-speak-
ing (metal) listeners, however, is low. In 
the context of this short essay, it would 
not make sense to repeat and discuss 
every single concept of popular culture 
as outlined by Storey. It must be clear, 
however, that “the popular” in popular 
culture needs to be defined precisely if 
there is to be any point to its usage. With-
out a clear definition, “popular culture” 
could not be distinguished from the sim-
ilarly ambiguous term “culture” (see the 
editorial of the present META issue).
Popular Culture in Islamic Studies
Having said this, I would now like to 
come back to the difficult relationship 
between Islamic studies and popular cul-
ture. Andrew N. Weintraub’s Islam and 
Popular Culture in Indonesia and Malay-
sia provides an inspiring new perspec-
tive that might help to overcome the 
antipathy to popular culture in Islamic 
studies. By comprehending popular cul-
ture “as a site of struggle over what 
counts as Islam” (2), Weintraub combines 
a neo-Gramscian approach with some of 
the traditional research interests of 
Islamic studies. The sites in which the 
struggle over the meaning of Islam takes 
place are identified by Weintraub as ser-
mon-filled soap operas, veils on rock 
stars, Prophet cartoons and other con-
temporary cultural phenomena through 
which religious meanings are not only 
being conveyed but (re)negotiated. The 
purpose of studying representations of 
Islam in popular culture thus promises to 
produce much needed knowledge on 
contemporary religiosities in the Muslim 
world and the (re)interpretation of Islam’s 
holy scriptures in the era of social media 
and modern communication technolo-
gies. With this in mind, any thought about 
the alleged incompatibility of Islam with 
popular culture appears obsolete.
What distinguishes the study of popular 
culture from traditional approaches to 
culture in Islamic studies, in my opinion, 
is that popular culture must be conceived 
as a product of modernity, while “Islamic 
culture” is traditionally conceptualized as 
originating from the early days of Islam, 
the theological interpretations of reli-
gious scriptures, and the intellectual dis-
courses of pre-modern thinkers (see the 
debate on Thomas Bauer’s concept of 
“Islamic culture” in the editorial). Popular 
culture, however, is the result of modern 
means of cultural production and there-
fore closely linked to the processes of 
industrialization, digitalization, medializa-
tion, and globalization. Moreover, it is 
important to stress the spectacular nature 
of popular culture. Popular culture, espe-
cially when seen as a site of controversy 
and struggle, requires public display. 
Having said this, I think it is important to 
continue to use the term “popular cul-
ture” and to further reflect upon its rela-
tional usage in the aforementioned con-
texts of contemporary representations of 
Islam and the politics of culture as related 
to the resistance toward authoritarian 
regimes.
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